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It is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition that a point be 
a Nash equilibrium point of a two-person, nonzero-sum game with a finite 
number of pure strategies is that the point be a solution of a single 
programming problem with linear constraints and a quadratic objective 
function that has a global maximum of zero. Every equilibrium point is a 
solution of this programming problem. For the case of a zero-sum game, 
the quadratic programming problem degenerates to the well-known dual 
linear programs associated with the game. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that for a two-person zero-sum game with a finite number 
of pure strategies, the finding of an equilibrium point is equivalent to a linear 
programming problem [l, p. 7521. The aim of this work is to show that a 
somewhat similar relationship exists between a Nash equilibrium point [2] 
of a two-person nonzero-sum game and a quadratic programming problem 
with linear constraints. The quadratic objective function has a global maxi- 
mum of zero over the constraint set. Since every equilibrium point is a solu- 
tion of this programming problem, it renders the objective function zero. 
Thus a constrained maximization technique capable of handling quadratic 
objective functions may be used. The objective function is not concave. 
However, it is known a priori that its global maximum on the constraint set is 
zero. Hence the lack of concavity is not a handicap, since in most computa- 
tional schemes, concavity of the objective function is invoked mainly to 
exclude local maxima. Here, a local maximum, if any, will be immediately 
discarded upon finding that its value is less than zero. 
The main result of this work is contained in the Equivalence Theorem 
of Section II, which states precisely the quadratic programming problem that 
has to be solved in order to obtain an equilibrium point of a nonzero-sum 
game. The proof depends on Nash’s existence theorem [2, Theorem l] 
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and the Kuhn-Tucker [3, Theorem 31 necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a constrained maximum. 
In Section III, the result of Section II is used to obtain equilibrium points 
of some nonzero-sum games. Rosen’s gradient projection computational 
scheme [4] is used to solve the quadratic programming problem. In all the 
examples solved, this scheme seems to work remarkably well. 
II. THEEQUIVALENT QUADRATICPROGRAMMINGPROBLEM 
Consider two players I and II with the mixed strategy vectors x and y 
respectively. Assume that x is of dimensionality n-by-l and y of dimension- 
ality m-by-l. Let the n-by-m matrices A and B be the payoff matrices to 
players I and II respectively. Player I maximizes over the rows of A, and II 
maximizes over the columns of B. Let e be an n-by-l vector of ones and I 
an m-by-l vector of ones. The objective of player I is to 
maximize x x’Ay 
subject to e’x - 1 = 0 
x >, 0, 
and of player II is to 
maximize 
Y 
x’By 
subject to Z’y - 1 = 0 
y 20, 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
where the primes denote the transpose. A Nash equilibrium point (x0, y”) [2] 
is defined as a pair of strategies x0 and y” where the objectives (2.1) and (2.2) 
are simultaneously fulfilled. More precisely we have 
xo’~yo = m;x {x’Ay” 1 e’x - 1 = 0, x > 0} 
xO’By” = rnYm {x”‘By 1 l’y (2.3) - 1 = 0, y 3 0). 
By a direct application of the Kuhn-Tucker necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions [3, Theorem 31 to the system (2.3), the following lemma that gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium point is obtained. 
LEMMA. A necessary and su$icient condition that (x0, y”) be an equilibrium 
3 
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point of (2.3) is that there exist scalar values 01~ and $ such that x0, y”, o~O, ,YJ 
satisfy 
xO'Ay0 - a0 = 0 (2.4) 
Xo’ByO - $ = 0 (2.5) 
Aye - orOe < 0 (2.6) 
B’# - $1 < 0 (2.7) 
e’xO - 1 = 0 (2.8) 
I>“- 1 =o (2.9) 
x020 (2.10) 
yo > 0. (2.11) 
Note that (YO and /3O, which are the negative of the multipliers associated with 
the constraints (2.8) and (2.9) respectively, are also equal to the expected 
payoffs to I and II respectively at the equilibrium point (x0, y”). Conditions 
(2.4) and (2.5) were obtained by simplifying x”‘(Ayo - a”e) = 0 and 
yO’(B’xO - j?Y) = 0 respectively with the use of (2.8) and (2.9). 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result. 
EQUIVALENCE THEOREM. A necessary and suficient condition that (x0, y”) 
be an equilibrium point of (2.3) is that it is a solution of the following program- 
ming problem 
maximize x’(A+B)y-LY--_B 
X,Y,a*@ 
(2.12) 
subject to Ay - me < 0 
B’x - fll < 0 
e’x - 1 = 0 
(2.13) 
Z’y - 1 = 0 
x > 0 
Y>O 
where a and t9 are scalars. The values of 01 and p at the maximum, ~8 and $, 
equal the expected payofls to players I and II respectively. Also, 
#‘(A+B)y”--o-/3”=0. (2.14) 
PROOF. First observe that conditions (2.13) are the same as conditions 
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(2.6) through (2.11). Hence by Nash’s existence theorem [2, Theorem l] and 
the Lemma, the set S of (x, y, a, /3) satisfying (2.13) is not empty. Furthermore 
x’(A + B)y - 01 - j3 = x’(Ay ~ Lye) + y’(B’x -~ @) < 0, (2.15) 
for (x, y, 01, /3) E S. It follows then that 
(2.16) 
Now let ~0, y” be an equilibrium point. Then by the Lemma, (x0, y”, OIO, /P) 
satisfies (2.4) to (2.1 l), and hence is in S. Further, from (2.4) and (2.5) 
x0’@ + B)y” - d’ - $ = 0. (2.17) 
It follows from (2.17), the fact that (x0, y”, OLO, 8”) is in S, and (2.16) that 
~“‘(A+B)yo--o-~o=xyma~sx’(A+B)y-u-~. (2.18) 
>_ 93 
Conversely now, let (xO,yO, aO, /I”“) be a solution of (2.12) (2.13) that is, 
let (2.18) be satisfied. Now from (2.16) 
a+“@ + B)y” - 01~ -$ GO. (2.19) 
However from Nash’s existence theorem and the Lemma, there exists at 
least one (x, y, 01, /3) E S which renders x’(A + B) y - OL - /3 = 0. So for 
(x0, ye, o1O, /P) to be a global maximum in S, (2.19) must be 
P(A+B)yO-d-/30=0. (2.20) 
It follows from (2.20) and the constraints (2.13) that 
xO'Ay0 - 010 = 0 x”‘Byo - ,P = 0. 
Hence (x0, y”, c1O, $) satisfies (2.4) to (2.11) and hence must be an equilibrium 
point. Q.E.D. 
REMARK 1. It can be shown that solutions of (2.12), (2.13) can always be 
found on some vertices of the convex polyhedral set (2.13). This fact may be 
used to find in effect all equilibrium points of the game, by determining a 
finite number of extreme equilibrium points that are on the vertices of (2.13). 
This will be discussed in more detail elsewhere. 
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REMARK 2. For the zero-sum case, B = - A, the quadratic program- 
ming problem (2.12), (2.13) degenerates to two linear programming problems 
in the variable y, 01 and X, y where y = - /3: 
min 01 max y 
Y.” X,Y 
subject to Ay - ale < 0 subject to - A’x $. yl < 0 
Z’y - 1 =o e’x - 1 = 0 
yb0 x 20. 
These are precisely the dual linear programs associated with the zero-sum 
game [I, p. 7521. 
III. NUMERICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
There appear to be only two previous papers [5, 61 that specifically deal 
with an actual numerical method for finding equilibrium points of two-person 
nonzero-sum games. However, the fictitious play method [7-91 originally 
proposed for finding saddle points of two-person, zero-sum games, seems to 
be applicable to finding equilibrium points of nonzero-sum games in an 
obvious fashion. 
It should be remarked here that the objective (2.12) is not concave. Hence, 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions [3, Theorem l] are necessary (but not sufficient) 
for the solution of (2.12), (2.13). Since the gradient projection method 
[4, lo] terminates only when the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied, it is 
conceivable that the gradient projection method may terminate at a point 
where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied but the objective function 
(2.12) is not zero. (However, no such case arose in the many cases that were 
run on the computer.) In this case, the problem must be restarted at some 
other point and run until the objective (2.12) is reduced to zero. On the 
other hand, if the objective function (2.12) can be shown to be quasic- 
concave,l then Theorem 1 of [l l] may be invoked (by noting that A and B 
may be made positive without loss of generality, the gradients of (2.12) 
can never be zero and hence condition (c) of Theorem 1 of [ 1 l] is satisfied) 
to show that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient to solve (2.12), 
(2.13) and hence the gradient projection method will not stop anywhere 
except at the global maximum. It should be remarked again here that in all 
the cases tried, the gradient projection method went straight to the global 
maximum in very few steps. 
1 A function B(x) is quasi-concave if, or each real number y, the set of x defined 
by p(x) > y is convex. 
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We shall now discuss two examples that were treated with the method 
proposed here. 
Example 1: “Battle of the Sexes” 
In this small example [12, p. 901, we find the two obvious pure-strategy 
equilibrium points and a mixed-strategy equilibrium point. In this game, 
the payoff matrices to players I and II are respectively 
2 -1 
A= -1 [ 11 
To find equilibrium points for this game, it is necessary and sufficient to 
solve the following quadratic problem 
subject to 2y, - ya - 01 < 0 
-y1+ Yz--GO 
x1- x,-p<0 
- Xl + 2% - B < 0 
x,+ x,-l=0 
y1+ yz--1=o 
Xl 20 
x2 2-O 
Yl 30 
Y2 > 0. 
Depending on the starting point, various equilibrium points were obtained 
with the gradient projection method. Each equilibrium point took less than 
TABLE I 
Starting point Equilibrium point 
X Y 
(1.0, 0.0) (1.0, 0.0) 1 
(0.8, 0.2) (0.8, 0.2) 1 
(0.0, 1.0) (0.0, 1.0) 2 
(0.2, 0.8) (0.2, 0.8) 2 
(0.5, 0.5) (0.5, 0.5) 3 
(0.8, 0.2) (0.2, 0.8) 3 
(0.2, 0.8) (0.8, 0.2) 3 
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5 seconds to obtain on an IBM 7090 computer, In addition to the obvious 
equilibrium points x = (1, 0), y = (1,O) and x = (0, l), y = (0, l), the 
present method gave the mixed-strategy equilibrium point x = (0.6,0.4), 
y = (0.4,0.6) with expected payoffs 01 = 0.2 and /3 = 0.2. The results were 
obtained to an accuracy of 8 significant places. We shall designate the three 
equilibrium points just given by the numbers 1, 2, and 3 respectively. In 
Table I we give the starting points of the gradient projection algorithm and 
the equilibrium point arrived at. 
Example 2: 
A somewhat more complicated example with 6 pure strategies for each 
player was also solved. This example was obtained by making discrete a 
certain continuous game. The continuous game is played over the unit 
square, the payoff to player I being 1 u - TJ 1 and to player II (UV - iv”), 
withO<u<l andO<v<l. 
The discrete game was obtained by evaluating the kernels 1 u - w 1 and 
(uw - 4 v”) at the points u = 0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8, 1.0 and w = 0,0.2,0.4,0.6, 
0.8, 1.0, to gil : the following payoff matrices: 
A= 
B= 
. 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
, 0.6 
0.8 
-1.0 
-0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
P 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 
0.4 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 
0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0.2 
0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 .O 1 
-0.02 -0.08 -0.18 -0.32 -0.50 
0.02 0 - 0.06 - 0.16 - 0.30 
0.06 0.08 0.06 0 -0.10 
0.10 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.10 
0.14 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.30 
0.16 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.50 
It can be easily verified that the above game has no equilibrium points in 
pure strategies. However, using the programming method proposed in this 
work, the Gradient Projection method found the following equilibrium point 
in 20 seconds on the IBM 7090 
x = (0.5,0,0,0,0,0.5) 
y = (0,0,0.5,0.5,0,0) 
with payoffs OL = 0.5, /I = 0.12. The starting point was x =y = (l/6, l/6, 
l/6, l/6, l/6, l/6). No other equilibrium points were found from other 
starting points. 
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The same problem was solved by the method of fictitious play 
[7-91. After slightly more than one minute of IBM 7090 time, 500 plays 
had been made with the result x = (0.502, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.498), y = (0.004, 
0, 0.498, 0.498, 0, 0), 01 = 0.5002, p = 0.11924. 
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